Sav Official Thread

[Nick R]

Hello NamePros community! We are creating a single thread where we can share announcements in, talk about product updates, people can ask questions and host a great discussion on all things domains!

 

[VaibhavA]

I paid for 7 domain transfers together 2 months ago.

After 2 months they have issued refund of 1 domain name, 6 refund remain.

I have been into domaining for almost 10 years now, never seen such a scammy registrar.

 

[End User King]

Show attachment 281675

I paid for 7 domain transfers together 2 months ago.

After 2 months they have issued refund of 1 domain name, 6 refund remain.

I have been into domaining for almost 10 years now, never seen such a scammy registrar.

I agree. I'm trying to completely remove my name from there as well. I've already moved my best domains months ago. Shady!!!!

 

[NameGroove]

I agree. I'm trying to completely remove my name from there as well. I've already moved my best domains months ago. Shady!!!!

Smart!!

 

[.tv]

Urgent Call for Recovery Advice and Legal Insights

Fellow NamePros members,

In the vast digital landscape where domains are our most cherished assets, gateways to businesses, brands, and dreams, one expects registrars to serve as vigilant guardians. Yet, my recent ordeal with Sav.com has shattered that illusion, revealing a harrowing vulnerability that could ensnare any of us.

What began as a routine registration spiraled into a nightmare of unauthorized theft, bureaucratic stonewalling, and suspected internal collusion. Allow me to recount this saga in detail, not merely to vent my frustration but to warn our community and solicit your collective wisdom on reclaiming what was illicitly taken. If you've navigated similar treacherous waters, your stories and strategies could be my lifeline, and a beacon for others.

The Genesis: A Seemingly Secure Registration

It all started innocently enough on June 9, 2025, when I registered a domain (redacted for privacy) through Sav.com. Secured with two-factor authentication (2FA) and under my sole management, it represented a strategic investment in my portfolio. For months, everything proceeded smoothly, no red flags, no anomalies. That is, until August 22, 2025, when an ominous email arrived from Sav.com: “Transfer of [Domain name redacted for privacy] Complete,” with the body curtly stating, “Your internal transfer of [Domain name redacted for privacy] is complete.”

Panic set in. I hadn't initiated, authorized, or even been notified of any transfer. No login alert. No 2FA prompt. No confirmation email. The domain had vanished from my account, spirited away through what Sav.com termed an "internal transfer", a process that bypassed every security layer I had in place. This wasn't a hack from afar; it felt like an inside job, executed with the precision of someone wielding backend privileges.

The Labyrinth of Support: A Week of Empty Promises

Within minutes, I launched a support ticket via their live chat, detailing the breach and demanding immediate restoration, a thorough investigation, and enhanced safeguards like mandatory 2FA for all transfers. The response? Initial acknowledgment from a support agent, followed by escalation to "advanced support" with assurances of swift resolution. But as hours turned to days, the pattern emerged: rote, copy-pasted replies echoing the same refrain, "We're investigating, but due to high volume, it may take 3-10 business days."

By August 23, frustration boiled over. I pressed for details: the receiving account's identity, transfer logs, and an explanation for the security lapse. Their reply? More delays, no substance. On August 24, I discovered the domain was now resolving to a Vietnamese website, with nameservers altered, clear evidence of tampering post-transfer. Yet, Sav.com's agents claimed helplessness, citing backlogs and lack of authority. Screenshots shared in the ticket underscored the urgency, but to no avail.

The saga dragged into August 26, with yet another generic update: "Escalated and pending." My threats of escalation, to ICANN, forums like this one, and legal counsel, fell on deaf ears. By August 29 (today), a full week later, the silence is deafening. No restoration. No investigation updates. Just platitudes about patience. This isn't service; it's a shield for negligence, if not outright complicity.

The Dark Suspicions: Internal Theft and Registrar Complicity

What elevates this from mishap to malice is the nature of the transfer. Confined within Sav.com's ecosystem, the domain landed in another account on their platform, untouched by external hackers, yet untouchable for me. Despite 2FA, no alerts triggered, suggesting bypassed protocols only insiders could manipulate. The rapid nameserver changes and foreign resolution point to deliberate exploitation, perhaps by rogue backend staff colluding with thieves. Sav.com's refusal to disclose logs or freeze the domain reeks of a cover-up, eroding trust in their stewardship of our digital treasures.

This isn't isolated incompetence; it's a systemic flaw that exposes us all. Shady registrars like Sav.com, with their opaque processes and lethargic support, transform from allies into adversaries. How many valuable domains must vanish before we acknowledge the peril? My experience underscores a stark truth: entrusting high-value assets to such platforms invites disaster. I urge fellow domainers, transfer out now to reputable registrars with proven security and responsive teams. Peace of mind is priceless; lingering with Sav.com is a gamble you can't afford.

Seeking Your Guidance: Paths to Recovery and Justice

NamePros community, you've been my go-to for insights, and now I turn to you in desperation. Has anyone endured a similar internal theft at Sav.com or other dubious registrars, where employees or colluders pilfer domains from under your nose? If you've successfully reclaimed yours, share your playbook: Did ICANN's complaints yield results? Was a UDRP filing through WIPO or NAF the key? What about domain recovery services like Hartzer Consulting or DNAccess, did they trace and retrieve effectively?

To the legal eagles among us, IP attorneys specializing in domain disputes, your expertise is invaluable. Should I prioritize an ICANN contractual compliance complaint for registrar negligence, or leap to UDRP for bad-faith transfer? With the domain still under Sav.com's umbrella, is there a way to compel disclosure of the thief's account?

And for international angles (like the Vietnamese resolution), how do we involve cybercrime units or Interpol without endless red tape?

Let's transform this ordeal into a collective triumph. Your advice could not only restore my domain but fortify our community against these shadows.

Together, we can unmask the vulnerabilities and demand better from the industry.

Grateful for your support!

 

[Gabriel360]

Urgent Call for Recovery Advice and Legal Insights

Fellow NamePros members,

In the vast digital landscape where domains are our most cherished assets, gateways to businesses, brands, and dreams, one expects registrars to serve as vigilant guardians. Yet, my recent ordeal with Sav.com has shattered that illusion, revealing a harrowing vulnerability that could ensnare any of us.

What began as a routine registration spiraled into a nightmare of unauthorized theft, bureaucratic stonewalling, and suspected internal collusion. Allow me to recount this saga in detail, not merely to vent my frustration but to warn our community and solicit your collective wisdom on reclaiming what was illicitly taken. If you've navigated similar treacherous waters, your stories and strategies could be my lifeline, and a beacon for others.

The Genesis: A Seemingly Secure Registration

It all started innocently enough on June 9, 2025, when I registered a domain (redacted for privacy) through Sav.com. Secured with two-factor authentication (2FA) and under my sole management, it represented a strategic investment in my portfolio. For months, everything proceeded smoothly, no red flags, no anomalies. That is, until August 22, 2025, when an ominous email arrived from Sav.com: “Transfer of [Domain name redacted for privacy] Complete,” with the body curtly stating, “Your internal transfer of [Domain name redacted for privacy] is complete.”

Panic set in. I hadn't initiated, authorized, or even been notified of any transfer. No login alert. No 2FA prompt. No confirmation email. The domain had vanished from my account, spirited away through what Sav.com termed an "internal transfer", a process that bypassed every security layer I had in place. This wasn't a hack from afar; it felt like an inside job, executed with the precision of someone wielding backend privileges.

The Labyrinth of Support: A Week of Empty Promises

Within minutes, I launched a support ticket via their live chat, detailing the breach and demanding immediate restoration, a thorough investigation, and enhanced safeguards like mandatory 2FA for all transfers. The response? Initial acknowledgment from a support agent, followed by escalation to "advanced support" with assurances of swift resolution. But as hours turned to days, the pattern emerged: rote, copy-pasted replies echoing the same refrain, "We're investigating, but due to high volume, it may take 3-10 business days."

By August 23, frustration boiled over. I pressed for details: the receiving account's identity, transfer logs, and an explanation for the security lapse. Their reply? More delays, no substance. On August 24, I discovered the domain was now resolving to a Vietnamese website, with nameservers altered, clear evidence of tampering post-transfer. Yet, Sav.com's agents claimed helplessness, citing backlogs and lack of authority. Screenshots shared in the ticket underscored the urgency, but to no avail.

The saga dragged into August 26, with yet another generic update: "Escalated and pending." My threats of escalation, to ICANN, forums like this one, and legal counsel, fell on deaf ears. By August 29 (today), a full week later, the silence is deafening. No restoration. No investigation updates. Just platitudes about patience. This isn't service; it's a shield for negligence, if not outright complicity.

The Dark Suspicions: Internal Theft and Registrar Complicity

What elevates this from mishap to malice is the nature of the transfer. Confined within Sav.com's ecosystem, the domain landed in another account on their platform, untouched by external hackers, yet untouchable for me. Despite 2FA, no alerts triggered, suggesting bypassed protocols only insiders could manipulate. The rapid nameserver changes and foreign resolution point to deliberate exploitation, perhaps by rogue backend staff colluding with thieves. Sav.com's refusal to disclose logs or freeze the domain reeks of a cover-up, eroding trust in their stewardship of our digital treasures.

This isn't isolated incompetence; it's a systemic flaw that exposes us all. Shady registrars like Sav.com, with their opaque processes and lethargic support, transform from allies into adversaries. How many valuable domains must vanish before we acknowledge the peril? My experience underscores a stark truth: entrusting high-value assets to such platforms invites disaster. I urge fellow domainers, transfer out now to reputable registrars with proven security and responsive teams. Peace of mind is priceless; lingering with Sav.com is a gamble you can't afford.

Seeking Your Guidance: Paths to Recovery and Justice

NamePros community, you've been my go-to for insights, and now I turn to you in desperation. Has anyone endured a similar internal theft at Sav.com or other dubious registrars, where employees or colluders pilfer domains from under your nose? If you've successfully reclaimed yours, share your playbook: Did ICANN's complaints yield results? Was a UDRP filing through WIPO or NAF the key? What about domain recovery services like Hartzer Consulting or DNAccess, did they trace and retrieve effectively?

To the legal eagles among us, IP attorneys specializing in domain disputes, your expertise is invaluable. Should I prioritize an ICANN contractual compliance complaint for registrar negligence, or leap to UDRP for bad-faith transfer? With the domain still under Sav.com's umbrella, is there a way to compel disclosure of the thief's account?

And for international angles (like the Vietnamese resolution), how do we involve cybercrime units or Interpol without endless red tape?

Let's transform this ordeal into a collective triumph. Your advice could not only restore my domain but fortify our community against these shadows.

Together, we can unmask the vulnerabilities and demand better from the industry.

Grateful for your support!

"Just platitudes about patience".

SAV.com's support are notorious for that. They seem to NEVER comprehend the meaning of the word "urgent".

That said, you shouldn't consider filing a UDRP just yet. It'll be difficult to prove element 1 (Identical/confusingly similar to a TM you own) if you only own the domain name for investment purposes.

First thing first, STOP threatening them with filing an ICANN complaint. Just file the complaint. File it immediately.

Secondly, you are on the right track about reaching out to Bill Hartzer. He should be able to help if the domain name was stolen.

Thirdly, understand that SAV.com may not necessarily have colluded to steal your domain name. Their incompetence might have just made it easier for a bad actor to steal it.

Domain names go missing from people's Sav.com account ALL the time. Lots of people have had that happen to them.

Also, if they are unable to return your domain name. Don't accept a $10 refund or whatever you paid for the domain name. Consider consulting an attorney and see if you can get your potential sale price for the domain name plus whatever your lawyer wants to be paid.

Finally, please write a review on TRUSTPILOT.

 

[alcy]

Urgent Call for Recovery Advice and Legal Insights

Fellow NamePros members,

In the vast digital landscape where domains are our most cherished assets, gateways to businesses, brands, and dreams, one expects registrars to serve as vigilant guardians. Yet, my recent ordeal with Sav.com has shattered that illusion, revealing a harrowing vulnerability that could ensnare any of us.

What began as a routine registration spiraled into a nightmare of unauthorized theft, bureaucratic stonewalling, and suspected internal collusion. Allow me to recount this saga in detail, not merely to vent my frustration but to warn our community and solicit your collective wisdom on reclaiming what was illicitly taken. If you've navigated similar treacherous waters, your stories and strategies could be my lifeline, and a beacon for others.

The Genesis: A Seemingly Secure Registration

It all started innocently enough on June 9, 2025, when I registered a domain (redacted for privacy) through Sav.com. Secured with two-factor authentication (2FA) and under my sole management, it represented a strategic investment in my portfolio. For months, everything proceeded smoothly, no red flags, no anomalies. That is, until August 22, 2025, when an ominous email arrived from Sav.com: “Transfer of [Domain name redacted for privacy] Complete,” with the body curtly stating, “Your internal transfer of [Domain name redacted for privacy] is complete.”

Panic set in. I hadn't initiated, authorized, or even been notified of any transfer. No login alert. No 2FA prompt. No confirmation email. The domain had vanished from my account, spirited away through what Sav.com termed an "internal transfer", a process that bypassed every security layer I had in place. This wasn't a hack from afar; it felt like an inside job, executed with the precision of someone wielding backend privileges.

The Labyrinth of Support: A Week of Empty Promises

Within minutes, I launched a support ticket via their live chat, detailing the breach and demanding immediate restoration, a thorough investigation, and enhanced safeguards like mandatory 2FA for all transfers. The response? Initial acknowledgment from a support agent, followed by escalation to "advanced support" with assurances of swift resolution. But as hours turned to days, the pattern emerged: rote, copy-pasted replies echoing the same refrain, "We're investigating, but due to high volume, it may take 3-10 business days."

By August 23, frustration boiled over. I pressed for details: the receiving account's identity, transfer logs, and an explanation for the security lapse. Their reply? More delays, no substance. On August 24, I discovered the domain was now resolving to a Vietnamese website, with nameservers altered, clear evidence of tampering post-transfer. Yet, Sav.com's agents claimed helplessness, citing backlogs and lack of authority. Screenshots shared in the ticket underscored the urgency, but to no avail.

The saga dragged into August 26, with yet another generic update: "Escalated and pending." My threats of escalation, to ICANN, forums like this one, and legal counsel, fell on deaf ears. By August 29 (today), a full week later, the silence is deafening. No restoration. No investigation updates. Just platitudes about patience. This isn't service; it's a shield for negligence, if not outright complicity.

The Dark Suspicions: Internal Theft and Registrar Complicity

What elevates this from mishap to malice is the nature of the transfer. Confined within Sav.com's ecosystem, the domain landed in another account on their platform, untouched by external hackers, yet untouchable for me. Despite 2FA, no alerts triggered, suggesting bypassed protocols only insiders could manipulate. The rapid nameserver changes and foreign resolution point to deliberate exploitation, perhaps by rogue backend staff colluding with thieves. Sav.com's refusal to disclose logs or freeze the domain reeks of a cover-up, eroding trust in their stewardship of our digital treasures.

This isn't isolated incompetence; it's a systemic flaw that exposes us all. Shady registrars like Sav.com, with their opaque processes and lethargic support, transform from allies into adversaries. How many valuable domains must vanish before we acknowledge the peril? My experience underscores a stark truth: entrusting high-value assets to such platforms invites disaster. I urge fellow domainers, transfer out now to reputable registrars with proven security and responsive teams. Peace of mind is priceless; lingering with Sav.com is a gamble you can't afford.

Seeking Your Guidance: Paths to Recovery and Justice

NamePros community, you've been my go-to for insights, and now I turn to you in desperation. Has anyone endured a similar internal theft at Sav.com or other dubious registrars, where employees or colluders pilfer domains from under your nose? If you've successfully reclaimed yours, share your playbook: Did ICANN's complaints yield results? Was a UDRP filing through WIPO or NAF the key? What about domain recovery services like Hartzer Consulting or DNAccess, did they trace and retrieve effectively?

To the legal eagles among us, IP attorneys specializing in domain disputes, your expertise is invaluable. Should I prioritize an ICANN contractual compliance complaint for registrar negligence, or leap to UDRP for bad-faith transfer? With the domain still under Sav.com's umbrella, is there a way to compel disclosure of the thief's account?

And for international angles (like the Vietnamese resolution), how do we involve cybercrime units or Interpol without endless red tape?

Let's transform this ordeal into a collective triumph. Your advice could not only restore my domain but fortify our community against these shadows.

Together, we can unmask the vulnerabilities and demand better from the industry.

Grateful for your support!

sorry to say but u rank 1 on 10 in making summaries

 

[NicTraders]

For anyone still using Sav, this https://www.namepros.com/threads/a-...d-my-domain-to-be-stolen-from-within.1361392/ seems pretty standard for them these days. I don't know if the domain has actually been stolen, or if it's just 'gone missing' as a result of Sav's incompetence, and apparently non-existent dev team. Either way, I would say get out while/if you still can.

 

[Bailian]

I want to understand why both PayPal and credit cards can be used normally for registering domains and participating in auctions, with payments processed successfully.

However, when a domain expires and enters the redemption period, and I contact customer support to redeem it, I am required to add "Account Credit" using a credit card. I followed the instructions and attempted to use my credit card, but the transaction was not successful. It only showed: "We have received your Deposit. It is now pending bank authorization. It usually takes 1 to 2 business days." Many days have passed, and the funds still haven’t been credited. I’ve contacted customer support multiple times, and they only created a support ticket. However, the issue remains unresolved, and there has been no progress on the ticket for many days!

I’ve had enough. I added three credit cards, all of which work perfectly on 99% of other websites, but not on SAV. Why haven’t you resolved this? Also, why is PayPal available for domain registration but not for redeeming domains?

 

[NicTraders]

I want to understand why both PayPal and credit cards can be used normally for registering domains and participating in auctions, with payments processed successfully.

However, when a domain expires and enters the redemption period, and I contact customer support to redeem it, I am required to add "Account Credit" using a credit card. I followed the instructions and attempted to use my credit card, but the transaction was not successful. It only showed: "We have received your Deposit. It is now pending bank authorization. It usually takes 1 to 2 business days." Many days have passed, and the funds still haven’t been credited. I’ve contacted customer support multiple times, and they only created a support ticket. However, the issue remains unresolved, and there has been no progress on the ticket for many days!

I’ve had enough. I added three credit cards, all of which work perfectly on 99% of other websites, but not on SAV. Why haven’t you resolved this? Also, why is PayPal available for domain registration but not for redeeming domains?

Unfortunately Sav won't reply as they have no representative who handles these enquiries here.

 

[alcy]

renewed few oldies
no issue
prices still one of best on sav on these tld.. not worth time to transfer

xrp vc
roleplay io
vru co

happy SAVings hahaha

 

[MHExplorer]

What is the method to close/delete account at Sav.com ?

 

[dr manos]

Coming Soon name servers along with nameservers for their marketplace sale landers return connection refused error, what a mess

 

[Hypersot]

I don't know what is wrong with this company but things are getting way worse.

I've been trying to transfer a number of cctld domains out for almost 2 months now and they won't give me the auth codes to initiate the transfer.
For some reason, there is no code shown on the UI so I had to ask them from the support. The only answer I'm getting, after numerous attempts, is "we're working on it".

Anyone staying with them takes a huge risk imo. I have already started transferring out all the other domains that I can get the codes from the UI. I suggest you all do the same asap.

 

[alcy]

I don't know what is wrong with this company but things are getting way worse.

I've been trying to transfer a number of cctld domains out for almost 2 months now and they won't give me the auth codes to initiate the transfer.
For some reason, there is no code shown on the UI so I had to ask them from the support. The only answer I'm getting, after numerous attempts, is "we're working on it".

Anyone staying with them takes a huge risk imo. I have already started transferring out all the other domains that I can get the codes from the UI. I suggest you all do the same asap.

did u try reset code?

never had issues with io and co

which ones r your problem?

 

[Hypersot]

Time passes nothing happens. Despite my numerous attempts, they keep avoiding giving me the codes.
Funny how helpless we are in situations like this.

 

[NameGroove]

I don't know what is wrong with this company but things are getting way worse.

Anyone staying with them takes a huge risk imo. I have already started transferring out all the other domains that I can get the codes from the UI. I suggest you all do the same asap.

 

[Ostrados]

Time passes nothing happens. Despite my numerous attempts, they keep avoiding giving me the codes.
Funny how helpless we are in situations like this.

Submit a complaint to ICANN

 

[Hypersot]

Submit a complaint to ICANN

Before I take drastic measures, I need to understand what is happening first. Even Tonic (the registry) is not willing to help which is strange.

I have already transferred domains with that extension using Namecheap and the transfer completed, literally, in seconds.

It wouldn't surprise me *at all* if this is the result of a completely messed up company (ie. zero communication between departments, etc.) hence my warning to avoid using them.

In the end I might go legal though since this involves around 40 domains. Still weighing my options.

 

[Simon SE]

Slowly moved all my domains away over the last year. Just 2 remaining. Seems I'm not the only one to be less than impressed.

 

[alcy]

89 left

I keep renewing vc io co there cause it's one of best or the best price

I dont mind

rest go to unstoppable. about 1.5k on 2k left for promo

sav remains the fastest ui ever anywhere
... as in what I need done sav does quickest

old ui
not new

but too much bad experience leave bad taste

names vanishing before
not renewed etc

is just too much

that is just not juat some silly bug

it's a catastrophe